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Recent Developments: Broussard v. State and the Not 
So Obvious Application of the Open and Obvious 
Doctrine 
John M. Church∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Every jurisdiction must determine the circumstances in which a 
tort defendant may be relieved of liability because of the nature of 
the fault or defect. In Broussard v. State,1 the Louisiana Supreme 
Court restricted one of the defenses available to defendants when it 
revisited the open and obvious doctrine announced in 1996 in Pitre 
v. Louisiana Tech.2 While the Broussard Court purportedly 
preserved the open and obvious doctrine, the case represents a 
significant and important limitation on the availability of the 
defense. Indeed, it could be argued that the limitation announced in 
Broussard effectively eliminates the open and obvious nature of the 
defect as an independent defense. Thus, Broussard could be one of 
the most important Louisiana tort cases decided in more than a 
decade. 
I. BROUSSARD V. STATE: RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF THE OPEN AND 
OBVIOUS DOCTRINE 
A. Factual Background 
Paul Broussard, a United Parcel Service (UPS) deliveryman, 
sued the State of Louisiana for damages he sustained in an accident 
on January 23, 2001, while loading a dolly into a misaligned 
elevator in Wooddale Tower in Baton Rouge.3 The Wooddale 
Tower is a state-owned office building with 12 stories and two 
elevators in the lobby.4 In 1998, Wooddale Tower’s roof was 
repaired, and the repair efforts generated a large volume of dust and 
debris.5 Over time, the construction dust and debris settled and 
accrued in the elevator relay, triggering the elevators to “operate 
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 1. See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 
178−79 (La. 2013). 
 2. Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585 (La. 1996). 
 3. Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 178−80. 
 4. Id. at 179. 
 5. Id. 
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erratically” for a period of several years.6 The built-up dust and 
debris caused the elevators to stop in between floors, forming an 
offset of space between the elevator floor and the building floors.7 
The space would range from a few inches to a few feet.8 The 
malfunctioning of the elevators and offset space did not go without 
notice by the tenants of Wooddale Tower, and several tenants 
expressed their concern of a future accident between 1999 and 
2000.9 The State proposed plans to fix the elevators in response to 
the complaints; however, the bidding was not completed until June 
20, 2001.10 
Prior to the accident, Broussard was an employee of UPS for 11 
years, and he worked as a delivery-truck driver for 7 of those 
years.11 Broussard made daily deliveries to Wooddale Tower and 
was fully aware of the building’s elevator problems.12 On the day of 
the accident, Broussard was attempting to deliver six boxes of 
computer paper on a dolly, weighing 300 pounds, to the eighth 
floor.13 One of the elevators was already open when Broussard 
entered the lobby, and the elevator was elevated between one and a 
half to three inches above the lobby floor.14 Two people had entered 
the elevator prior to Broussard, and one of the occupants testified 
that Broussard initially put the dolly in front of his body and tried to 
push the dolly into the elevator.15 The misalignment of the elevator 
and the ground floor prevented Broussard from being able to push 
the dolly in, so he turned around, stepped backward into the 
elevator, and attempted to pull the dolly into the elevator shaft.16 As 
he was pulling the dolly backward, Broussard cleared the gap, but 
he soon lost control of the dolly and was forcefully propelled back 
into the elevator.17 As a result of the accident, Broussard suffered a 
serious back injury, was diagnosed with a centrally-herniated, 
                                                                                                             
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. Employees of the Department of Social Services, one of the tenants of 
Wooddale Tower, even sent a memorandum to their supervisor on July 10, 2000, 
in which they expressed their concern that the elevators (1) would not stop in a 
position level with the building floors, causing employees to trip upon entering or 
exiting the elevator shaft and (2) would drop between a few inches and feet when 
people would enter or exit the elevator shaft. Id. 
 10. Id. at 179–80. 
 11. Id. at 180. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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degenerative disc, and could no longer perform his duties as a UPS 
deliveryman because his doctors advised him against heavy lifting.18 
B. Procedural History 
After a three-day trial on August 23–26, 2010, the jury found in 
Broussard’s favor, concluding that the space between the lobby and 
elevator floors created an unreasonable risk of harm and Broussard 
was 38% at fault.19 The jury found that Broussard suffered 
$1,589,890.23 in damages but reduced this number to $985,732.56 
to account for his comparative fault.20 On appeal by the State, the 
First Circuit reversed, finding that the district court’s conclusion that 
the offset created an unreasonable risk of harm was manifestly 
erroneous.21 The First Circuit applied the four-prong, risk–utility 
balancing test22 to determine that the offset did not create an 
unreasonable risk of harm because the social utility of the elevator 
offset the risk of the faulty but readily apparent condition of the 
elevator.23 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the decision of 
the First Circuit finding that the offset of space represented an 
unreasonable risk of harm and the faulty condition of the elevator 
was not an open and obvious hazard.24 
C. Law and Analysis 
In Broussard, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the owner 
of the building was only responsible for injuries caused by 
conditions that create an unreasonable risk of harm.25 Whether a 
condition creates an unreasonable risk of harm is a mixed question 
of law, fact, and policy; the Court in Broussard determined that the 
question was for the trier of fact and should be determined at the 
breach and not the duty stage.26 The trier of fact utilized a four-
prong, risk–utility balancing test to determine whether the condition 
was unreasonably dangerous: 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. Specifically, Broussard was advised not to lift more than 70 pounds. 
Id. 
 19. Id. at 180−81. 
 20. Id. at 181. 
 21. Id. See also Broussard v. State, No. 11–0479, 2012 WL 1079182 (La. Ct. 
App. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 22. See, e.g., Pryor v. Iberia Parish Sch. Bd., 60 So. 3d 594, 597 (La. 2011) 
(per curiam); Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 591–93 (La. 1996).  
 23. Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 181. 
 24. Id. at 194. 
 25. Id. at 183 (citing Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1148–49 (La. 
1983)). 
 26. Id. at 183–85. 
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(1) the utility of the complained-of condition; 
(2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the 
obviousness and apparentness of the condition; 
(3) the cost of preventing the harm; and  
(4) the nature of the plaintiff’s activities in terms of its social 
utility or whether it is dangerous by nature.27 
In discussing the magnitude of the harm and the open and 
obviousness of the risk, the Court concluded that the “elevators 
presented a significant and likely risk of harm” and that “the State had 
a heightened degree of care precisely because these elevators were 
malfunctioning and had become dangerous instrumentalities.”28 In 
examining whether the open and obvious doctrine applied, the Court 
emphasized that the plaintiff’s individual knowledge of the risk is not 
the proper standard but knowledge by all who might use the elevator 
is required.29 Otherwise, the Court noted that the individual plaintiff’s 
awareness or knowledge of a condition is just one Watson factor to be 
considered in the assessment of comparative fault.30 The Court 
concluded that even though Broussard and the other occupant of the 
elevator at the time of the accident knew of the elevator problems, 
there were enough recorded instances of employees tripping or falling 
on the misaligned elevator that could lead a reasonable jury to 
conclude that the misalignment of the elevators was not open and 
obvious to all.31 
II. THE LOUISIANA OPEN AND OBVIOUS DOCTRINE: FROM MURRAY 
TO PITRE 
The open and obvious doctrine has its beginnings in the notion 
that landowners were immune from liability related to their land.32 
Landowners had no duty to protect invitees from obvious conditions 
because “invitees [were], in most circumstances, expected to protect 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. at 184 (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. at 187. The Court noted that this heightened duty made this case 
different from an ordinary slip and fall case. Id. 
 29. Id. at 188. 
 30. Id. at 188–89. See Watson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 
967, 974 (La. 1985) (adopting the Uniform Comparative Fault Act for the fact 
finder to assess the nature of the conduct of the parties through a set of five factors 
and to aid in assigning fault percentages to the parties). 
 31. Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 190. 
 32. See 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 741 (“A landowner is not liable for injury 
resulting from a condition which should have been observed by an individual in 
the exercise of reasonable care or which was as obvious to a visitor as to the 
landowner.”). 
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themselves from obvious dangers.”33 Moreover, a victim who 
“assumed the risk” or voluntarily embraced the risk was unable to 
recover from the tortfeasor,34 and the defendant could use this 
argument as an affirmative defense.35 Similarly, at common law, a 
tortfeasor who was negligent in any way or assumed the risk was 
deemed to have been “contributorily negligent,” and any amount of 
negligence would completely bar recovery.36 However, the doctrine 
of contributory negligence has been abandoned in most states, 
including Louisiana, and Louisiana has now opted for a pure 
comparative fault system in which both the tort victim and tortfeasor 
are assigned a percentage of fault.37 Under a comparative fault 
system, the plaintiff’s recovery is not completely barred but limited 
by his or her own contributory negligence.38 There is necessarily an 
overlap between conduct that would be classified as negligent and 
conduct that would be classified as an assumption of the risk. So as 
many states began to turn away from contributory negligence to a 
comparative fault system, the question remained whether 
assumption of the risk would be an affirmative and complete 
defense to any recovery from the tortfeasor or merely reduce or limit 
the plaintiff’s ability to recover.39 The Louisiana experience is 
described below. 
A. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc. 
In 1988, in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., the Louisiana Supreme 
Court determined the continued viability of the assumption of the 
risk doctrine in a certified question from the U.S. Fifth Circuit.40 
Although the Louisiana Legislature had eliminated contributory 
fault, it did not specifically address the role of assumption of the risk 
                                                                                                             
 33. James P. End, The Open and Obvious Doctrine: Where Does It Belong in 
Our Comparative Negligence Regime?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 445, 457–58 (2000). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). 
 35. See id. cmt. b. 
 36. See, e.g., Soileau v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 398 So. 2d 648 (La. Ct. App. 
1981). 
 37. For a thorough discussion of the development of comparative fault in 
Louisiana, see Frank L. Maraist, H. Alston Johnson III, Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. & 
William R. Corbett, Answering a Fool According to His Folly: Rumination on 
Comparative Fault Thirty Years On, 70 LA. L. REV. 1105 (2010). A pure 
comparative fault system is one in which the plaintiff’s ability to recover is not 
barred if the plaintiff’s fault exceeds or equals the defendant’s percentage of fault. 
Id. at 1108. 
 38. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323 (2014). 
 39. Murray v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 821 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1987), certifying 
question to 521 So. 2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988). 
 40. 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988). 
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in the new comparative fault regime.41 In Murray, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that the assumption of the risk doctrine is not a 
discrete, affirmative defense but its application is embraced in the 
comparative fault system.42 In Murray, the plaintiff twice dove into a 
shallow motel pool and on his third dive, suffered a serious injury that 
eventually led to his death.43 The Court determined that Murray’s 
decedents’ recovery was not barred by whether he knew or should 
have known of the risk that he assumed.44 The type of assumption of 
the risk embraced by the comparative fault system is known as 
“implied secondary.”45 The Court reasoned that because the 
Legislature abolished contributory negligence and implied secondary 
assumption of the risk was “in reality a form of contributory 
negligence,” implied secondary assumption of the risk should not 
operate as an affirmative defense.46 
However, there are two situations where the Murray Court 
suggested that the plaintiff’s conduct would apply as an affirmative 
and complete defense.47 The first is an “express consent” case when 
the plaintiff explicitly releases the defendant from any liability.48 
The second type of conduct is when a plaintiff places him or herself 
in a situation to face “virtually unpreventable risks,” which the 
Murray Court noted was called “implied primary” assumption of the 
risk by many jurisdictions.49 Implied primary cases involve a 
“particular activity or situation” in which the plaintiff is deemed to 
have consented to the risk, although no “express” waiver was 
given.50 In Murray, the Supreme Court offered the “textbook 
example” of a sports spectator who is struck by a fly ball at a 
baseball game.51 In such a situation, the plaintiff would be deemed 
to have assumed the risk by his or her attendance at the game, and 
his or her ability to recover would be completely barred by the 
theory of implied primary assumption of the risk.52 Although the 
Court effectively removed assumption of the risk as a defense, the 
                                                                                                             
 41. See id. at 1132; Murray, 821 F.2d at 273. 
 42. Murray, 521 So. 2d at 1124 (holding that a swimmer’s knowledge of the 
dangerousness of diving into a shallow pool did not bar recovery against the 
Ramada Inn motel owner and operator who failed to provide a lifeguard in 
violation of Louisiana law or signs warning against shallow water). 
 43. Id. at 1125. 
 44. Id. at 1134. 
 45. Id. at 1129. 
 46. Id. at 1125. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1129. 
 51. Id. at 1125. 
 52. See id. 
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Murray Court’s language preserves a class of cases where the 
defendant will be completely relieved from liability. The recognition 
in Murray that no-liability cases persist after the abolition of the 
assumption of the risk defense ultimately led to the open and 
obvious doctrine.  
B. Washington v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 
Two years after Murray, “one might have thought that the duty-
risk analysis in a case involving an open and obvious risk would not 
involve any judicial inquiry or consideration of the plaintiff’s actual 
knowledge of the risk.”53 However, in Washington v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., the Court took the plaintiff’s knowledge of the 
unreasonably dangerous condition to determine that the defendant–
power company had a duty to the plaintiff but there was no breach 
of that duty.54 In Washington, the victim, Washington, was 
electrocuted when his radio antenna came into contact with a high 
voltage wire in his backyard.55 Five years prior to that fatal accident, 
Washington’s antenna had come into contact with the power line, 
shocking and burning Washington and his son.56 After that first 
accident, “he expressed concern for his life and afterward exercised 
great caution” when dealing with the antenna.57 After “his close 
call,” Washington requested that the power company insulate the 
power line or move it underground, but the power company told 
Washington that this action could only be undertaken at 
Washington’s expense.58 The trial court found in favor of 
Washington; however, the Fourth Circuit determined that because of 
Washington’s past experience with the power line and his 
carefulness in handling the antenna after the first accident, the power 
company did not breach its duty.59 Then Justice Dennis, writing for 
the Louisiana Supreme Court, affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s 
determination and applied a cost–benefit analysis to determine that 
the defendant was not liable because of the low probability that the 
antenna would make contact with the power line (and the resulting 
damage) was outweighed by the benefits of the line and the cost to 
insulate.60 While Justice Dennis characterized the case as a “no-
breach” case, at least one scholar has argued that it was really a “no-
                                                                                                             
 53. Maraist, et al., supra note 37, at 1115. 
 54. 555 So. 2d 1350 (La. 1990). 
 55. Id. at 1351. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1352. 
 59. Id. at 1353. 
 60. Id. at 1353–55. 
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duty” case.61 Moreover, the consideration of Washington’s actual 
knowledge in determining breach seems to be contrary to the 
holding in Murray. 
In deciding that there was no breach of the applicable standard 
of care, the Court considered Washington’s actual knowledge of the 
risk of danger from the distribution line in his backyard to conclude 
that the probability of an accident occurring was extremely low.62 
This low probability led to the no-breach (or perhaps no-duty) 
conclusion.63 The plaintiff’s knowledge essentially entered the case 
“through the back door,” not to simply reduce recovery but to bar 
it.64 One may argue that the decision in Washington is technically 
consistent with the Murray duty analysis because the Court was not 
considering actual knowledge to define duty. However, actual 
knowledge was considered to conclude that there had been no 
breach of the relevant duty.65 The result in either case was the same: 
no recovery. Likewise, note that if Washington is a breach case, the 
Court made the decision about breach, not the jury; the jury had 
concluded that, in fact, there was liability, including breach.66 
C. Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University 
The open and obvious doctrine was most clearly defined in Pitre 
v. Louisiana Tech University.67 In Pitre, a rare winter ice and 
snowstorm occurred in Ruston, Louisiana.68 Pitre and three other 
Louisiana Tech students arranged themselves on top of a trashcan 
lid, head first, and another student pushed them, launching the 
“sled” down the hill.69 Pitre hit a concrete light pole in Tech’s 
                                                                                                             
 61. See Maraist et al., supra note 37, at 1117−18. 
 62. See Washington, 555 So. 2d at 1353−54. 
 63. See id. at 1353–55. 
 64. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1136 (La. 1988) (noting 
that if the plaintiff’s knowledge were used to define the duty that assumption of 
the risk would be retained as a total and complete bar to recovery). 
If accepted, defendants’ argument [that the tort victim’s knowledge 
barred recovery] would inject the assumption of risk doctrine into 
duty/risk analysis “through the back door.” By that, we mean that the 
argument attempts to define the defendant’s initial duty in terms of the 
plaintiff’s actual knowledge, and thereby seeks to achieve the same result 
which would be reached if assumption of risk were retained as a defense, 
i.e., a total bar to the plaintiff’s recovery. 
Id. 
 65. See Washington, 555 So. 2d at 1353−55. 
 66. See id. at 1353; see also Maraist, et al., supra note 37, at 1118. 
 67. 673 So. 2d 585 (La. 1996). 
 68. Id. at 586–87. 
 69. Id. at 586−88. 
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parking lot on his descent and sustained serious spinal injuries.70 
The Court clarified that a relevant inquiry of the duty–risk analysis 
of negligence is the obviousness and apparentness of the potentially 
dangerous condition, and if that condition “should be obvious to 
all,” the defendant does not owe a duty to the plaintiff.71 Therefore, 
Justice Victory concluded, “Tech had no duty since the light pole 
was obvious and apparent and the risks of colliding with it while 
sledding are known to everyone.”72 
In Pitre, the majority determined that the issue of potential 
negligence for Tech was an issue of “no duty.”73 However, Justice 
Lemmon in his concurrence reasoned that this was actually a case in 
which there was a general duty, but there was no breach.74 
Moreover, scholars have noted that in Pitre the Court focused on the 
question of duty but still performed the cost–benefit analysis that is 
used when determining whether there has been a breach.75 However, 
it was this same cost–benefit analysis that was used to determine 
that the power company in Washington did not breach its duty.76 
Moreover, in the wake of Murray, Washington, and Pitre, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court continued to tie the question of whether a 
duty existed to a duty–risk analysis for breach of a duty.77 The Pitre 
Court then relied on its opinion in Murray to determine that the 
individual plaintiff’s state of mind is not the correct measurement of 
the defendant’s duty, but the duty should be determined by that 
which the defendant owes to all people who were on campus on the 
evening of the accident and not just to Pitre himself.78 
III. APPLYING PITRE: APPLICATION OF THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS 
DOCTRINE IS NOT SO OBVIOUS 
In Pitre, the Court signaled that defendants could avoid liability 
where, as a result of a risk or defect being open and obvious, the 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. at 587−88. 
 71. Id. at 591. 
 72. Id. at 586. 
 73. Id. at 590−91. 
 74. Id. at 596. 
 75. See Maraist, et al, supra note 37, at 1122; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., 
Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence: Some Ramblings Inspired by Robertson, 57 
LA. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1997). 
 76. See Washington v. La. Power & Light Co., 555 So. 2d 1350, 1353−54 
(La. 1990). 
 77. See Maraist et al., supra note 37, at 1125 (citing Hutchinson v. Knights of 
Columbus, Council No. 5747, 866 So. 2d 228 (La. 2004)). 
 78. Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 590−91 (La. 1996) (citing 
Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1136 (La. 1988)). 
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condition did not represent an unreasonable risk of harm.79 
However, the lower courts applied the doctrine inconsistently. 
Rather than developing a consistent standard, lower courts struggled 
to apply an uncertain doctrine. By analyzing a number of lower 
court cases that applied a version of the open and obvious doctrine, 
some patterns are revealed. First, the number of cases appeared to be 
increasing. From 1998 to 2005, there were 26 cases discussing the 
open and obvious doctrine.80 From 2006 to 2013, there were 55.81 
Thirty cases relied on the doctrine to relieve the defendant of 
liability.82 However, only 20 of the cases applying the open and 
obvious doctrine utilized a detailed risk–utility analysis like that 
performed in Pitre and, ultimately, Broussard.83 While this statistic 
is far from scientific, it does reveal that lower courts were uncertain 
about the proper application of the open and obvious doctrine. 
As a result, the Broussard Court took the opportunity to clarify 
the doctrine.84 First, the Court clarified that the standard for defining 
an “open and obvious” risk is that it must be actually open and 
obvious to all.85 The actual knowledge of the plaintiff is irrelevant 
because such a standard would be the equivalent of assumption of 
the risk, a doctrine eliminated by the Legislature, as interpreted by 
the Court in Murray.86 Second, the Court clarified that the fact that 
the defect was open and obvious is just a part of the larger risk–
utility analysis, the analysis applied in virtually all fault-based cases 
to determine if the condition represented an unreasonable risk.87 The 
notion of the open and obvious risk analysis as a part of the 
unreasonable risk analysis is consistent with Pitre but, as revealed 
above, was not universally applied by the lower courts or even the 
                                                                                                             
 79. See supra Part II.C. 
 80. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747, 866 
So. 2d 228 (La. 2004); McGuire v. New Orleans City Park Imp. Ass’n., 835 So. 
2d 416 (La. 2003); Robertson v. State, 747 So. 2d 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
 81. See, e.g., Trautmann v. Fitzgerald, 113 So. 3d 429 (La. Ct. App. 2013); 
Watts v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 43 So. 3d 266 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Jeansonne v. S. 
Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 8 So. 3d 613 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Leonard v. Ryan’s 
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 939 So. 2d 401 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 82. See, e.g., Babino v. Jefferson Transit, 110 So. 3d 1123 (La. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 83. See, e.g., Smalley v. Ransonet, No. CA 13-522, 2013 WL 5951509 (La. 
Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2013). 
 84. See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175 (La. 
2013). 
 85. Id. at 188. 
 86. Id. (“Our ‘open and obvious to all’ principle is not a hollow maxim. 
Rather, it serves an invaluable function, preventing concepts such as assumption 
of the risk from infiltrating our jurisprudence.”). 
 87. Id. at 185. 
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Supreme Court.88 Finally, the Court ruled that the open and obvious 
doctrine is a question of breach, rather than duty.89 This issue had 
been highlighted in both Washington and Pitre, with judges and 
scholars on both sides of the issue.90 However, the Pitre Court 
unequivocally treated the question of whether the defect was open 
and obvious as a part of the duty element.91 The importance of 
treating the question as part of the breach analysis, which is a 
question of fact, is that it is much more likely that cases will be 
submitted to the jury.92 Whether this benefits plaintiffs or defendants 
is an open question, but the strategy employed by the parties will 
clearly change as a result of Broussard. 
The following Section reveals that the Louisiana experience 
with the open and obvious doctrine is consistent with the experience 
in other jurisdictions. 
IV. OPEN AND OBVIOUS HAZARDS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON 
LAW DOCTRINE 
With roots in English and early American common law and 
most likely derived from the political power of landowners prior to 
the 20th century, the open and obvious doctrine eliminates 
landowner liability to business visitors resulting from open and 
obvious dangers.93 “The rationale of the open and obvious doctrine 
is that the defendant should not be held liable for harm caused by a 
danger that was open and obvious to the person suffering the 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. at 191 (“Admittedly, it appears our recent per curiam opinions have 
produced a patchwork of inconsistent jurisprudence. . . . There is no bright-line 
rule. The fact-intensive nature of our risk-utility analysis will inevitably lead to 
divergent results.”). 
 89. Id. at 185−86. 
 90. See Maraist et al., supra note 37, at 1110 (describing the long academic 
debate between professor and practitioner Alston Johnson and Professor David 
Robertson on victim fault and scope of the risk). 
 91. Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 590−91 (La. 1996). 
 92. See Mundy v. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 620 So. 2d 811, 813 (La. 
1993) (opining that whether a duty is owed is a question of law, but whether a 
defendant has breached a duty is a question of fact). 
 93. Michalski v. Home Depot, Inc., 225 F.3d 113, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(outlining the transformation of the open and obvious doctrine). See 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 340 (1934) (providing that “a possessor of land is not 
subject to liability to his licensees . . . for bodily harm caused to them by any 
dangerous condition thereon, whether natural or artificial, if they know of the 
condition and realize the risk involved therein”); James P. End, Comment, The 
Open and Obvious Danger Doctrine: Where Does It Belong in Our Comparative 
Negligence Regime?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 445, 457 (2000) (“Landowner 
sovereignty resulted from the belief that landowners possessed the right to use 
their land as they so chose.”).  
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harm.”94 The open and obvious doctrine was widely criticized by 
legal scholars and courts as being too harsh, however, and courts 
began to depart from it in the mid-20th century.95 In 1965, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts was published, recognizing this trend 
and modifying its assessment of the open and obvious doctrine so 
that “[a] possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical 
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose 
danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should 
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”96 As a 
result, jurisdictions throughout the country have retreated from strict 
application of the open and obvious doctrine, departing “from the 
traditional rule absolving, ipso facto, owners and occupiers of land 
from liability for injuries resulting from known or obvious 
conditions, and [moving] toward the standard expressed in section 
343A(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).”97 
Under the Second Restatement, a landowner should anticipate, 
and is liable for failing to remedy, the risk of harm from obvious 
hazards when an invitee could be distracted from observing or 
avoiding the dangerous condition or may forget what he or she has 
discovered, and the landowner has “reason to expect that the invitee 
will nevertheless suffer physical harm.”98 This principle is known as 
the “distraction exception” to the open and obvious rule.99 For 
example, a landowner should anticipate that, in certain circumstances, 
                                                                                                             
 94. Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution, the Courts and the Common Law, 53 
WAYNE L. REV. 153, 172 (2007). 
 95. See James Fleming, Jr., Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed 
to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 628 (1954); Page Keeton, Personal 
Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 
642–43 (1952); see, e.g., Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Ctr., Inc., 144 
N.W.2d 870, 874 (Iowa 1966) (“To arbitrarily deny liability for open or obvious 
defects and apply liability only for hidden defects, traps, or pitfalls, is to adopt a 
rigid rule based on objective classification in place of the concept of the care of a 
reasonable and prudent man under the particular circumstances.”). 
 96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965). 
 97. Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 231 (Ill. 1990) (listing cases from 
state supreme courts that have adopted the Second Restatement approach). See 
Kentucky River Med. Ctr. v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Ky. 2010) (“[T]he 
modern trend, as embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is the better 
position.”). But see Jones Food Co., Inc. v. Shipman, 981 So. 2d 355, 363 (Ala. 
2006) (holding that no duty was owed with regard to open and obvious dangers); 
Armstrong v. Best Buy Co. Inc., 788 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (Ohio 2003) (holding 
same). 
 98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1965). 
 99. Id. See Kenneth R. Swift, I Couldn’t Watch the Ball Because I Was 
Watching the Ferris Wheel in Centerfield, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 34 (2005) 
(noting that comment f has been extensively applied by numerous jurisdictions). 
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store displays will distract customers and potentially prevent them 
from discovering and avoiding even conspicuous dangers. 
This principle was exemplified in the 2000 U.S. Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals opinion Michalski v. Home Depot.100 In Michalski, 
a customer of a warehouse store was injured when she tripped and 
fell over a pallet left on a forklift while walking down an aisle to 
view and purchase bathroom cabinets.101 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the warehouse store, finding that the 
pallet was an open and obvious danger.102 In predicting New York 
law, the Second Circuit applied the reasoning espoused by the 
Second Restatement and held that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment against the patron because questions of material 
fact existed as to whether the store was liable, either because the 
condition was made unreasonably dangerous due to the fact that 
customers would not anticipate encountering it in that location or 
because it was reasonably foreseeable that customers would be 
distracted by merchandise from observing the pallet near the 
floor.103 The court rejected the traditional approach, stating that “even 
obvious dangers may create a foreseeable risk of harm and 
consequently give rise to a duty to protect or warn on the part of the 
landowner.”104 The Michalski court recognized that: 
[T]he open and obvious nature of a dangerous condition on 
its property does not relieve a landowner from a duty of care 
where harm from an open and obvious hazard is readily 
foreseeable by the landowner and the landowner has reason 
to know that the visitor might not expect or be distracted 
from observing the hazard.105 
By relying on the modified rule, the Second Circuit, like courts 
across the country, upheld the general duty of reasonable care.106 
The general duty of reasonable care is the focus of the newly 
adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm 
section 51: 
[A] land possessor owes a duty of reasonable care to entrants 
on the land with regard to: 
(a) conduct by the land possessor that creates risks to 
entrants on the land; 
                                                                                                             
 100. Michalski v. Home Depot, Inc., 225 F.3d 113, 115 (2d. Cir. 2000). 
 101. Id. at 115. 
 102. Id. at 116. 
 103. Id. at 121. 
 104. Id. at 119. 
 105. Id. at 121. 
 106. Id. at 120. 
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(b) artificial conditions on the land that pose risks to 
entrants on the land; 
(c) natural conditions on the land that pose risks to entrants 
on the land; and 
(d) other risks to entrants on the land when any of the 
affirmative duties . . . is applicable.107 
The duty espoused in the newest iteration is similar to, and 
includes, both the general landowner’s duty imposed with regard to 
invitees in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343 and the 
distraction exception to the open and obvious rule reflected in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343A.108 Thus, under the 
Third Restatement, landowners bear a general duty of reasonable 
care to all entrants, regardless of the open and obvious nature of 
dangerous conditions. The “duty issue must be analyzed with regard 
to foreseeability and gravity of harm, and the feasibility and 
availability of alternative conduct that would have prevented the 
harm.”109 While the open and obvious nature of the conditions does 
not automatically preclude liability, it is part of assessing whether 
reasonable care was employed.110 In considering whether reasonable 
care was taken, the fact-finder must also take into account the 
surrounding circumstances, such as whether nearby displays were 
distracting and whether the landowner had reason to suspect that the 
entrant would proceed despite a known or obvious danger.111  
                                                                                                             
 107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 
(2012). 
 108. Id. § 51 cmts. a and k. 
 109. Coln v. City of Savannah, 966 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1998), overruled on 
other grounds by Cross v. City of Memphis, 20 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Tenn. 2000). 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. i 
(2012). 
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 
cmt. k (2012). 
 111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1965). See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. k 
(2012) (explaining that a warning ordinarily would be futile when the danger is 
open and obvious). 
Known or obvious dangers pose a reduced risk compared to comparable 
latent dangers because those exposed can take precautions to protect 
themselves. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, a residual risk will 
remain despite the opportunity of entrants to avoid an open and obvious 
risk. 
Id. 
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V. THE LOUISIANA VERSION OF THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DOCTRINE: 
AN ASSESSMENT 
Scholars and judges seem to be in agreement that there is a class 
of cases where the defendant should be relieved of liability because 
the defect is so apparent that the defendant’s conduct does not 
represent an unreasonable risk.112 The relevant question is whether 
the open and obvious doctrine adequately captures those cases. The 
corollary question is whether the open and obvious doctrine is even 
capable of capturing those cases. States that have addressed the issue 
have answered these questions in a variety of ways, ranging from 
the elimination of the doctrine, to the preservation of the doctrine 
with a distraction exception, to the retention of the doctrine in its 
historical, defendant-friendly form.113 In Broussard, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court technically retained the rule but signaled that it 
should simply be a part of the risk–utility analysis that is part of 
every fault-based case, a result consistent with the latest trend.114 
The necessity for the change from Pitre is demonstrated by the 
facts and procedure of Broussard itself.115 The facts indicate that 
others had tripped over and complained about the gap prior to Mr. 
Broussard’s injury, indicating that this was not a defect “known to 
all.”116 Thus, the desirable result is that the State take some 
precautionary action and eliminate the defective condition. 
Similarly, Mr. Broussard certainly bears some share of fault. In fact, 
the jury allocated a percentage of fault to Mr. Broussard.117 On the 
facts, the result in Broussard is defensible and, perhaps, correct. 
In addition, a significant number of lower courts were applying 
the open and obvious doctrine without a careful risk–utility analysis, 
effectively eliminating the distraction exception recognized in most 
jurisdictions that retain the doctrine.118 
The more difficult question concerns the implication of the 
principle announced in Broussard. Most jurisdictions recognize that 
even open and obvious risks may be unreasonable.119 Thus, most 
cases should go to the jury to be evaluated under the typical risk–
utility standard announced in Broussard and Pitre.120 However, the 
Court may have restricted judicial freedom to the point of 
                                                                                                             
 112. See supra Part IV. 
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effectively eliminating the open and obvious doctrine. Only time 
will tell whether the standard announced by the Court will properly 
identify those single-care cases where the defendant should be 
relieved of liability. 
